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Abstract
“The Strength of Weak Ties” argument (Granovetter 1973) says
that the most valuable information is best collected through bridging
ties with other social circles than one’s own, and that those ties tend
to be weak. Aral and Van Alstyne (2011) added that to access com-
plex information, actors need strong ties (“high bandwidth”) instead.
These insights I integrate and generalize by pointing at actors’ benefits
and costs. Weak ties are well-suited for relatively simple information
at low costs, whereas for complex information, the best outcomes are
expected for those actors who vary their bandwidths along with the
value of information accessed. To support my claim I use all patents
in the USA (two million) over the period 1975—1999.
Introduction
How do people get valuable information1 to solve their problems and to
satisfy their needs? Sometimes they can get it from their own experience or
intelligence. Most of the times, however, they strongly rely on their network
as a radar and filter, compare what they hear and see (and read, in modern
societies), and attempt to combine useful information into solutions [5]. To
make beneficial comparisons and combinations, it turns out that, in general,
diverse information is key [27].
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When studying information search from a network perspective, detailed
knowledge about the content of ties is usually lacking; it is a challenge to
model information diversity in a general way, and predict beneficial use of it
in a broad range of fields. Would network diversity, i.e. a focal node’s con-
nections to mutually disconnected nodes, be sufficient, or would additional
indicators be necessary? A large portion of the literature confirms that for
ego (a focal actor) to access diverse information, (s)he should broker across
“structural holes” between alters, or information sources in general, in dif-
ferent social groups [6, 29]. Within groups, people are highly clustered; this
clustering fosters mutual comprehension and coordination. But continual
interactions render shared information relatively homogeneous. Rather, as
the most valuable information is heterogeneous, clustering constrains access
to it [15]. Moreover, within-group ties are relatively strong with regards to
engagement and time spent, whereas between-group ties tend to be weak
[26]. Consequently, “average” brokers mostly use weak ties to access diverse
information across different groups.
In a recent paper, Aral and Van Alstyne [2] proposed, by contrast, the
notion that for ego to obtain diverse but complex or rapidly changing infor-
mation, (s)he must use strong ties, called high bandwidth in those contexts,
even if this implies a loss of some structural holes being brokered. Although
strong ties’ benefits have been noticed in previous studies [30, 18], Aral and
Van Alstyne support the trade-off they discovered by an impressive data set
collected from an executive recruiting firm, as it exceptionally contained not
only network ties but also the content of these ties. Among their findings,
the authors showed that information diversity is indeed enhanced by net-
work diversity. This finding supports earlier studies in which tie content was
largely unknown. In their case study, by helping to shorten project duration,
efficiency was the benefit of diverse information.
In most cases, however, it is unlikely that the information value is the
same across sources. One wonders, then, if an optimal average bandwidth
could predict the highest benefits. By taking both benefits and costs into ac-
count, I attempt to integrate and generalize the weak tie and high bandwidth
theses. Relatively simple information can be accessed through weak ties at
low transmission, processing, and tie maintenance costs, whereas complex
or rapidly changing information requires high bandwidth and effort, all else
being equal. However, to access complex information, actors should avoid
spending large resources on low value information, and will benefit more if
they focus on the best sources they can get access to, given cognitive and
institutional limitations. For weak ties to low value sources, in contrast, costs
are low and higher exploration risks can be taken. In sum, if bounded ratio-
nal actors search for simple information, network diversity and weak ties are
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their best options, but once they have to trade-off network diversity for band-
width, when information is complex or rapidly changing, the best outcomes
are expected for those who vary their bandwidths along with the quality of
their sources. This effect of bandwidth variation, then, is the hypothesis to
be tested in this paper.
In fields, such as science, technology and in knowledge-intensive indus-
tries, where valuable information is complex, actors have to invest time and
effort in certain sources, oral or written, and achieve a skillful command of the
knowledge they will have acquired through them. To successfully broker and
cross-fertilize complex information, accessing those sources must therefore
be accompanied by specialization in those sources, which imposes substan-
tial costs. For these actors, specialization is not only a process of accumu-
lating knowledge in a given domain, but also of interrelating their knowl-
edge more densely such that they may discover shortcuts and workarounds.
In a service industry, for example, this means that employees have to ac-
quaint themselves with their colleague’s skills, knowledge and personalities,
their clients’ wishes and idiosyncrasies, and learn effective solutions to the
problems at hand. Clearly, for obvious cognitive limitations, nobody can
specialize in a great many alters or sources simultaneously; this implies a
diversity-bandwidth trade-off. This conclusion also holds true for collectives,
such as organizations, even though they are able to process more information
than individuals.
However, we know from science studies that “standing on the shoulders
of giants,” i.e. using the best sources available, has strong positive effects,
both on individuals’ careers and on the accumulation of public knowledge
[3]. Furthermore, successful PhD students often have good supervisors [22];
famous philosophers owe part of their success to being connected to other
famous philosophers [11]; and, successful innovations build on prior success-
ful ideas [8]. In all these studies, information value varies across sources,
and obtainable benefits vary with them, which corroborates my bandwidth
variation thesis. Because none of these studies is based on a research design
specifically targeted toward testing it, I will test it here using a longitudinal
data set of patent citations. In the pertaining field of technology, the infor-
mation in patents is complex (although not rapidly changing), and people
have to invest considerable time and effort to master the sources they tap.
In the next section, I describe the data and the network measures. Sub-
sequently, I present the results, and discuss them in the final section.
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Data and measures
For the empirical test I use publicly available data on a network in which the
nodes are “invisible colleges” of inventors (n = 417), at the aggregate level,
and which incorporate all patents in the USA (two million) over the period
1975—1999 (USPTO).2 The administrative units corresponding to these col-
leges of inventors are technology domains wherein patents are categorized.
These units are both stable and non-overlapping over the period of obser-
vation, while other units are non-stable, overlapping, or both [19]. Just like
scientific citations, patent citations (as directed ties in the network) represent
knowledge flows, and explicate which ideas have been (re)combined into a
new idea. The period of observation is partitioned into non-overlapping sub-
periods, lasting five years each, consistent with other studies using patent
data [28]. Over the 25 years of observation, the density of the network
(m/n2, for a network with loops) gradually increased from 0.217 in the first
period to 0.395 in the last, while the average path length (concatenation of
ties from a node to node another) shrank from 1.83 to 1.62.
Actors can self-specialize by re-using knowledge produced earlier. At
the level of a domain, self-specialization means that a myriad of individ-
uals within the domain cite each other and sometimes themselves. Self-
specializing individuals build upon earlier experiences, which they integrate
with their current experiences or with others’ information. In a network,
self-specialization is indicated by a tie from a node to itself (reflexive arc,
or loop). For technology domains, self-specialization ties are the strongest
on average, and increased from 1508 to 7287 citations over the period of
observation, compared to 1086 to 6722 for dyadic ties, respectively, in the
range from 0 to 79337. Further details of these data have been presented and
discussed elsewhere [9].
To measure nodes’ brokerage (network diversity), I use betweenness cen-
trality [4, 14]; see Appendix. It is independent from tie strength variation
that should be measured separately. Whereas betweenness normally takes
into account all shortest paths from here to there through a focal node, recent
studies have shown that information further away than ego’s direct connec-
tions does not contribute to ego’s brokerage opportunities [7, 1]. In line with
these findings I truncate shortest paths longer than two ties, and only count
structural holes between pairs of unconnected nodes in direct contact with
ego. We may call this measure between-two-ness, to contrast it with the
earlier notion that boiled down to between-everybody-ness. Obviously, a tie
2The data were harvested in 2001 from http://www.uspto.gov/. I exclude from the
initial 418 domains one inactive one. Variable values of temporarily inactive domains were
coded “NA” (non available) to prevent taking the logarithm of zero later on.
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between two alters closes the structural hole for ego, renders alters’ infor-
mation more homogeneous, and does not contribute to ego’s brokerage. Yet
heterogeneity is also reduced by multiple indirect contacts between alters
[25], which at the same time diminish exclusive access to the structural hole.
Accordingly, the value of a structural hole is reduced by the number of nodes
that have access to it (i.e., are structurally equivalent with respect to the
structural hole). Finally, in citation networks where actors create valuable
ideas by (re)combining information they take from sources, rather than just
being middle (wo)men, I restrict between-two-ness to structural holes among
actors’ outgoing (citation) ties.
Bandwidth (average tie strength) can be calculated by weighted outde-
gree (nr. of citations) divided by outdegree (nr. of cited domains). For its
variation, I use an entropy measure [12], to facilitate comparison with other
studies and data. The following example is meant to foster an intuitive un-
derstanding. If you want to know where Bianca bought the book you notice
on her table, when you only know that she buys from three different book-
shops equally often (her three ties have the same strength), you need some
additional information to pin down the particular shop. This information
corresponds to an amount of entropy. If, in contrast, your want to know
where Abi bought her latest book, knowing that she has one favorite among
her three bookstores (one tie is much stronger than the other two), you have
a reasonable chance that her book came from there. Your a-priori uncer-
tainty about Abi’s bookstore is lower than about Bianca’s, and an average
search for it requires less additional information, expressed by lower entropy.
In the general measure, entropy is highest if all ties are equally strong, and
low if the focal node has one or few strong ties, and weak ties with its re-
mainder contacts. The measure is based on proportional tie strengths, pij, to
be reached by row-normalizing the adjacency matrix, after ensuring that the
arcs point to the direction of citations (or of information asked, in studies of
organizations). It is normalized for the number of ties, which have already
been taken into account in between-two-ness. For node i with (out)degree
ki, normalized tie strength entropy is calculated by
SN (i) =
−
∑k
j=1 pijlog(pij)
log(ki)
(1)
Information value, or the quality of its source, is arguably difficult to
measure in general, but in the technology and science fields one can mea-
sure citation impact [16]. This indicates, crudely, how valuable or relevant
others find certain information to be to their own inventions or research, re-
spectively. Although this measure is incomplete and possibly biased as with
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regards to individual patents, noisy data can be informative at the aggregate
level of technology domains [20]. I include self-citations, because they indi-
cate part of the economic viability of a domain [17]. In short, I sum over the
columns of the adjacency matrix, A, to create a (column) vector of citation
impact, y, for each of the five sub-periods.
Because it takes time to patent, and to separate cause and effect, the
predictors are lagged over one five-year period, L = t−1, where t is an index
of time periods and L is the lag. For the response variable, benefits obtained
by using certain information, I use the focal nodes’ current citation impact,
because it indicates the economic value for the patent holders [20].
To assess the effect of a node’s variation of tie strengths along the value of
its sources, I construct a measure of network autocorrelation [21], in which
each weighted outgoing tie is multiplied by the value (citation impact) of
the node (domain) being cited. I row-normalize the adjacency matrix [21],
resulting in a matrix W. My hypothesis can then be formalized as y ∝
WLyL. From entropy and bandwidth, self-citations are excluded, and the
parametrized model is:
y = ρWLyL +XLβ + ǫ. (2)
Because of unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. variation in R&D spending across
domains and time, Eq. 2 must be expanded to a fixed effect panel model with
time dummies. Furthermore, some of the covariates of nodes in ego’s net-
work neighborhood might be autocorrelated with Wy, and consequentially,
estimates in Eq. 2 could be biased [13]. Therefore I first estimate
Wy = W⋄LXLα + ǫ⋄, (3)
where W⋄ is obtained from W by setting the diagonal to zero, and by row-
normalizing the remainder ties. It turns out that in Eq. 3, autocorrelated
entropy is significant, hence I add it as a control to Eq. 2.
For all variables except entropy, the logarithm is used to make their distri-
butions symmetrical, to straighten their curvilinear relations before comput-
ing the correlations (Table 1), and to use them appropriately in the models.
For the same reasons, entropy is raised to the power of 1.5.
Results
The results are presented in Table 2, with the empty model for the time
periods in the first column. For the effects and models, P < 0.001, except
for some insignificant effects indicated by a dot.
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cited varval between bandw entropy
cited 0.667 0.830 0.859 -0.484
varying-with-value 0.452 0.727 -0.450
between-two-ness 0.635 -0.250
bandwidth -0.666
mean 6699 10375 127.50 17.67 0.749
SD 10651 9819 199.74 20.01 0.082
Table 1: Correlation matrix; the predictors have their one-period lag. The loga-
rithm is used for all variables, except entropy that is raised to the power of 1.5.
For the means and standard deviations, the raw data are used.
Model Varval shows the effect of varying tie strength with information
value, and supports my hypothesis.3 Yet I establish two additional tests: I
examine the effects of average bandwidth and its variation separately, and
then put all variables together. Having high bandwidth on average is benefi-
cial (Band), a result that provides strong support for Aral and Van Alstyne’s
thesis because its confirmation comes from an entirely different field. Low
variation of tie strength (high entropy) relates negatively to citation impact
(Entro), which shows that also varying bandwidth is beneficial, not only
having high bandwidth on average.
When putting all variables into one model (All), it is clear that broker-
age, measured as between-two-ness on outgoing ties,4 contributes to success,
which we could glean from many earlier studies. The remainder variables
keep their significance except entropy, possibly because of multicollinearity
(Table 1). When taking these findings together, they do strongly suggest
that for the field of technology, my hypothesis is correct.
Discussion and conclusion
To get valuable information, actors benefit from brokering across diverse,
i.e. disconnected, sources. Aral and Van Alstyne (2011) added that when
3When leaving out self-citations, and substituting W⋄ for W, the coefficient becomes
0.846 (0.086). When modeling without tie strength altogether, thus ignoring its variation
and substituting a binarized (and then row-normalized) matrix for W, the coefficient
becomes 0.743 (0.165). In both variations of the Varval model, the overall R-squared is
lower, namely 0.705 and 0.687, respectively.
4When substituting undirected between-two-ness for citation between-two-ness, the
significance levels of all effects stay the same, whereas the pertaining coefficient becomes
0.233 (0.019). For the resulting model, R2 = 0.812.
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Time Varval Band Entro All
variation with value 0.888 0.289
(0.059) (0.064)
bandwidth 0.839 0.543
(0.038) (0.048)
entropy -2.286 −0.287•
(0.212) (0.222)
between-two-ness 0.157
(0.016)
autocorrelated entropy -0.360 0.003• 0.001• −0.082•
0.068 0.056 0.063 0.059
R2 0.674 0.731 0.773 0.710 0.814
F 863 664 833 595 657
n 2085 1641 1641 1638 1620
Table 2: Fixed effect models over four 5-year periods with a one-period lag. For the
models and effects in them, P < 0.001, unless indicated by a dot when insignificant.
information is complex or rapidly changing, actors have to trade-off network
diversity for bandwidth, while most earlier studies emphasized the strength
of weak ties. I integrated and generalized these different findings by looking
at costs and benefits: for relatively simple information, network diversity
can be accessed through weak ties at low transmission, processing, and tie
maintenance costs, whereas for complex or rapidly changing information,
when actors have to trade-off network diversity for costly bandwidth, those
who vary their bandwidths along with the quality of their sources will have
the best outcomes.
In this study, bandwidth variation was assessed at the aggregate level
of technology domains, but it is very likely to hold true also for organiza-
tions and individuals. Put differently, it seems very unlikely that individuals
having their strongest ties to sources that provide irrelevant or false informa-
tion would outperform those using their strongest ties to acquire the most
valuable information instead.
Bandwidth variation along the value of information was measured by net-
work autocorrelation. Computer simulations [23] have demonstrated that in
dense networks, such as technology domains, autocorrelation is systemati-
cally under-estimated. Therefore, the effect of varying tie strength is even
stronger in actuality than estimated here.
Low variation of bandwidth was shown to be advantageous in a study
on British telephone data, which were stripped of content for the sake of
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privacy [12]. The nodes in that network were postal code-delimited commu-
nities, as sources and recipients of information. Tie strength was measured
by time spent (volume of calls) by one node calling another node over a
period of one month. There, more equally divided attention across sources,
indicated by high entropy (Eq. 1), correlated positively with a community-
aggregated index of economic welfare (r = 0.73). In that study, it is clear
that in the large numbers of calls, exchanges of sophisticated information
were by far outnumbered by more mundane exchanges. For all those sim-
ple subject matters, even valuable ones, strong ties imply redundancy rather
than progressive knowledge refinement. Dedicating a great deal of attention
to relatively few sources has therefore no advantages, or only briefly, while
it precludes people and their communities from getting more valuable infor-
mation elsewhere. Low variation of bandwidth is therefore advantageous in
fields with generically simple information.
Part of potential information benefits depends on how well actors can
integrate new information with their prior knowledge. Actors’ absorptive
capacity for new information on a given topic is enhanced by specialization
in that topic and its sources [10]. These actors are then better able to notice
valuable information amidst noise, including brokerage opportunities that
laymen overlook. “Chance favors the prepared mind,” as Louis Pasteur said.
Specialization has long term network efficiency as well: once it has reached
an adequate level, weaker ties with the pertaining sources will suffice to stay
up to date.
Over a longer period of time, actors may exploit their sources to a point
where their potential for novelty runs dry or their value diminishes in other
ways, e.g. by becoming obsolete or unreliable. They can then dis-intensify
old ties and establish new ones, accumulate specializations over time, and
alternate or combine specializing with brokering [9]. Both cross-sectionally
and longitudinally, it is beneficial for them to vary the strength of their ties.
Seen from a historical perspective, it is clear that since the beginning
of industrialization, the potential benefits of combining information have
increased considerably [24], if irregularly and unequally. The importance of
varying tie strength has increased accordingly.
Appendix: a mini course in brokerage
To understand the network structure of brokerage in general, refer to Fig-
ure 1. For simplicity’s sake, information is transmitted in both directions for
all pairs of actors, so the ties are edges. Obviously, a static network image
is an idealization of a far more complex pattern of social interactions, where
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the transmission of information is neither continuous nor simultaneous. Yet
this simplification works quite well in many cases. In Figure 1, focal node A
may combine different information received from mutually disconnected C,
D and E, which would be unproblematic for A if B were not there. If B
uses and recombines information received from C and D, for example C’s de-
mand and D’s offer in a market, B competes with A and reduces A’s chance
to strike a deal first. In creative fields, B’s resulting idea is likely to be more
similar to A’s, who draws partly from the same sources, than if B were to use
sources unrelated to A’s; B does not necessarily reduce A’s information di-
versity, but it does reduce A’s chance for novelty [8]. In general, structurally
equivalent others, who are to some extent related to the same alters as ego
(i.e. have niche overlap), tend to reduce ego’s opportunities, and reduce the
value of the structural hole for ego. Let us now examine the opposite case,
when B provides useful information to C and D; they get the benefit first,
and may increase their benefit by cross-fertilizing B’s idea with A’s. In this
situation, A has a timing disadvantage, might receive B’s idea incomplete or
distorted through C or D, or may not hear about B’s idea at all. The latter
is almost certainly the case for ideas that B receives from F . The example
illustrates that A should be in direct contact with her sources; in this case
timing and reliability are best. Information is useful to a broker where and
when the news breaks [5], while “second-hand brokerage” is not [7], hence
long paths in the widely used measure of betweenness are to be truncated
to paths of length two, resulting in what might be called between-two-ness
(Eq. 4). Finally, alters connected directly, here by adding a tie between C
and D, may exchange information without involving A at all, thereby remov-
ing A’s brokerage opportunity entirely. In sum, useful nodes for ego are at a
distance of two ties away from each other, such that ego sits astride between
those places where “useful bits of information are likely to air, and provide
a reliable flow of information to and from those places” [5].
For focal node i and its contact nodes j and l, a structural hole is the
lack of a direct tie between j and l; then the numerator (Eq. 4) of between-
two-ness gjil = 1. If there is a tie between j and l, there is no structural
hole, and gjil = 0. If there is a structural hole, its value diminishes with the
number of nodes that access it, as discussed above, which is expressed in the
denominator in Eq. 4, where i’s competitors are indexed on the dot in gj.l. In
Figure 1, for the structural hole between C and D, gC.D = 2, because both
A and B access it. To compute between-two-ness of focal node i, one simply
adds up its competition-weighted structural holes across all pairs of contact
nodes,
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A C
D B
E
F
Figure 1: A network wherein focal node A brokers three structural holes between
her contacts E, C, and D, while B competes for the hole between C and D.
CB2(i) =
∑
j<l
gjil
gj.l
(4)
A brokers three structural holes of which one is contested by B, and ac-
cordingly, CB2(A) = 2.5. Notice that if ties are asymmetric, as they are in
citation networks, a path in one direction of the arcs is often different, and
is to be counted separately, from a path in the opposite direction.
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